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The Close Corporation in California-
Necessity of Separate Treatment
By ROBERT L. OPPEmnm*
THE CLOSE CORPORATION is in essence a partnership with
limited liability.' The usual corporate separation of ownership from
management does not exist. It would seem, therefore, that the doc-
trines created to service an organization where ownership is separated
from management should have little or no application to close cor-
porations.2
The purposes of this article are to examine some of the more well
defined needs and practices of close corporations; to determine the
extent to which these needs are recognized and allowed by present
California law; to inquire into the desirability, and in some instances
to suggest the adoption, of changes in present corporation law which
would more adequately recognize these needs and practices. This
article will attempt to justify a separate and independent treatment
of the problems peculiar to close corporations; it being the author's
opinion that attempts to apply the same principles to both public
issue and close corporations can lead only to confusion.8
* B.S. 1957, Indiana University; LL.B. 1960, University of California at Los Angeles;
Teaching Associate at Indiana University.
I On the close corporation generally see: O'NEAI., CLOSE CoPoA-Ms: LAW AND
PRAcTicE (1958) (hereinafter cited as O'NEAL); Schwarzer, Practical Problems of Organ-
izing Closely Held Corporations, in AVISING CAL1Foua Busmss ENTERPRISES 403
(State Bar of Cal., Comm. on Continuing Education of the Bar, 1958) (hereinafter cited
as ScnwAnzm, CEB); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man
Company, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1373 (1938); Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incor-
porated Partnership, 18 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953); Latty, The Close Corpora-
tion and the North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432 (1956); Rut-
ledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 305 (1937);
Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MicH. L. REV. 273 (1929);
A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700
(1958); Note, Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARv. L. REv.
1498 (1958).
2"It would seem that an intelligent approach to the general problem of incorporation
would require at least three types of general incorporation laws in each state: One for
the single incorporator, another for the small concern, and a third for the extensive busi-
ness . . . ." Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WAs.
U.L.Q. 305, 339 (1937).
3 The need for separate statutory regulation of close corporations had been recog-
nized in some jurisdictions. Of particular note is the new North Carolina Business Cor-
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What Is a Close Corporation?
At present, California has no statutes specifically recognizing the
close corporation as a distinct form of business association.4 But occa-
sional judicial recognition of the basic differences between close and
public issue corporations is not sufficient to cope with the problems
presented by the nature of close corporations. It seems essential to
the proper administration of all corporations that separate statutory
treatment be given to some aspects of the close corporation. 5 Separate
treatment is necessary because it would be improper to allow a public
issue corporation the same freedoms here recommended for a close
corporation. If a separate treatment of close corporations is to be
employed, a definition of the species must first be set forth.
Close corporations are usually characterized by: (1) substantial
identity of ownership and management; (2) ownership by a small
number of shareholders; (3) no general market for the stock, and (4)
some limitation upon admission of shareholders. 6 A statutory defini-
tion of a close corporation, which is necessary to any special treatment
of the problems of such corporations, should encompass most of these
characteristics. The North Carolina Business Corporations Act7 is the
only statute which limits its application, in any extent, to close cor-
porations." This Act defines a close corporation as one where it is not
the case that "shares of the corporation are at the time or subsequently
become generally traded in the markets maintained by securities
dealers or brokers. . . ."9 This definition seems inadequate. It encom-
passes only one of the characteristics of close corporations. Further-
more, it is sufficiently vague that it would give rise to much litigation.
A more definite, though perhaps more arbitrary, definition placing a
porations Act., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1-55-175 (1960), which seeks to meet some
of the needs of close corporations. Note however only one section, § 55-73(b), of that
act is limited to close corporations in its application. This raises the problem of the
possible abuses of such acts when sought to be used by public issue corporations. As can
be seen, there is a necessity for delimiting the scope of remedial legislation. See English
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, and Gower, The English Private Company,
18 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 535 (1953).
4 Several sections of the Corporations Code treat the problems of close corporations
but such sections are also applicable to public issue corporations. See note 3 supra.
5 "[T] o permit the technical rules as commonly applied to corporations to be applied
in the case of a close family corporation of two shareholders of equal ownership, would
serve to defeat such equality of ownership, impede justice and perpetrate fraud." Kauff-
man v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730, 739, 140 P.2d 210, 215 (1943). See also Hyman
v. Karl Stern Co., 61 Cal. App. 672, 215 Pac. 913 (1923).
6 1 O'NEAL 13; ScawAnzER, CEB 403.
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1-55-175 (1960).
8 See note 3 supra.
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-73(b) (1960).
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limit on the number of shareholders would seem more desirable. The
following definition is suggested:
(A) A corporation shall be considered a close corporation for
purposes of this statute when:
(1) The number of shareholders does not exceed ten.10
(2) Its articles prohibit any invitation to the public to
subscribe for any shares of stock, either common or
preferred, in the corporation.
(B) A corporation shall not be considered a close corporation
if one of its stockholders is itself a corporation which is
not a close corporation.
(C) It is not necessary that the articles of incorporation of
a close corporation place a restriction on the transfer of
its shares, but if at any time such shares become gen-
erally traded in markets maintained by securities dealers
and brokers, or the number of stockholders exceeds ten,
the corporation shall cease to be considered a close cor-
poration.
(D) A person shall not be considered a shareholder in the
corporation solely because of his (or her) community
property interest in the stock of his (or her) spouse."
The Close Corporation as a Separate Entity-
The Alter Ego Doctrine
It is important to recognize the partnership-type character of close
corporations. The courts, however, tend to over-extend the concept
and often look through the corporation to hold the shareholders liable
for its acts. The resulting "alter ego" doctrine is one of the most per-
plexing aspects of close corporation law. The doctrine is particularly
perplexing because of the various situations to which it is applied.
10 Though any limitation of this type is to some extent arbitrary, the limitation on
the number of shareholders was set at ten for two reasons:
(1) It is felt that the number of stockholders should be low;
(2) Subehapter S (Nr. REv. CoDE OF 1954 §§ 1371-77) gives shareholders of a
corporation having less than ten shareholders an option to be taxed essentially as if they
were in partnership. Section 1371(a)(1). It is thought that this ability to avoid the
double taxation associated with the corporate form will increase the popularity of the
close corporation to low income businesses. It was therefore felt to be advisable to inte-
grate the close corporation regulatory statute with the taxing statute.
"1 This proposed definition is a hybrid of those definitions found in N.C. Gmar. STAT.
ANN. § 55-73(b) (1960) and § 28 of the English Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
c. 38. See Cower, The English Private Company, 18 LAw & CoNTrux. PaoB. 535 (1953).
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One type of problem is that which arises where a stockholder acts
and the corporation either seeks to benefit, 12 or a third party seeks
to bind the corporation by this action. 13 On occasion the courts have
held that stockholder's action cannot bind the corporation because the
particular activity can only be transacted by the board of directors.1
4
This has been so held even though the particular shareholders were
also the directors. 15 In such situations the close association between
ownership and management that is inherent in a close corporation de-
mands that the shareholders be recognized as proper agents of the
corporation. In a close corporation the formalistic organization of
public issue corporations performs no useful function. Any reference
to it as a binding pattern governing corporate activity leads only to
confusion when discussing close corporations. The close corporation
should be bound by or entitled to the benefits of shareholders acts
regardless of whether at the time of the transaction the individuals
were acting in their capacity as shareholders rather than as directors
or officers.16
There appears to be a growing tendency to recognize shareholders'
authority to bind the corporation. However, it is proposed that a stat-
ute of the type set forth below would assure judicial recognition of
this business reality:
A holder of the voting stock of a close corporation shall be
considered an agent of the corporation for the purpose of its
business, and the acts of any such stockholder shall bind the
12 Group Property, Inc. v. Bruce, 113 Cal. App. 2d 549, 248 P.2d 761 (1952).
13Wenban Estate Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924); Minifie v.
Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Chapman v. Sky L'Onda Mutual Water Co.,
69 Cal. App. 2d 667, 159 P.2d 988 (1945); McCormick Saeltzer Co. v. Grizzly Creek
Lumber Co., 74 Cal. App. 278, 240 Pac. 32 (1925).
14 Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11 (1867); Chapman v. Sky L'Onda Mutual Water
Co., supra note 13. In Gashwiler v. Willis, supra, a deed executed by three of five stock-
holders upon authority of a vote of the stockholders was void as to the corporation because
the vote was by the stockholders in their capacity as stockholders rather than in their
capacity as directors. This case has been cited and followed often. See, e.g., Hotaling v.
Hotaling, 193 Cal. 368, 224 Pac. 455 (1924).
15 Id. A related problem is the binding effect on the corporation of a shareholder's
agreement. This will be discussed at another point in this article.
16 "[T]he separate entity concept should be viewed only as a shorthand formula for
summarizing the attributes of a corporation for a fairly long list of legal issues in the solu-
tion of which the corporation is to be viewed as if it were a person distinct from the
shareholders. (This list would include such important issues as liability for corporate
debts.) It should not be used as the dogmatic premise from which, by sheer logic, one
drives to the seemingly inescapable conclusion that whatever be the issue, the corporation
is something completely separate and apart from the shareholders, let the chips fall where
they may." Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation,
34 N.C.L. REv. 471, 472 (1956). BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
LAws 79 (1949).
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corporation; unless by the articles, by-laws or vote of the board
of directors, authority to bind the corporation has been with-
held from such stockholders and the person with whom the
stockholder is dealing knew of such lack of authority. An act
of a stockholder which is not apparently for carrying on the
business of the corporation in the usual way does not bind the
corporation unless authorized by a vote of the shareholders.
The problem arising when third persons seek to bind the share-
holders for debts of the corporation is different than that arising from
attempts to bind the corporation for shareholder actions, and requires
a different solution. In regard to the latter problem it was above said
to be desirable to disregard the separate character of the corporation.
In the problem of imposing liability on the shareholders, however, the
corporations separateness should be preserved. Once the limited lia-
bility concept is justified it should not be disregarded because of the
mere fact that the shareholders are few in number,"7 or that they
perform all the corporate functions without conforming to corporate
formalities,"' or that they are in a "unity of interest" with the cor-
poration.' 9 However, if a corporation is inadequately financed, or by
means of their greater knowledge of corporate affairs and their op-
portunity for controlling corporate assets, the shareholders have used
the corporation as a shield in defrauding creditors, liability should be
imposed directly on such shareholders.20 "Alter ego" should play no
part in such situations. It should be the character of the transaction
rather than the character of the corporation upon which shareholder
liability is based.
An example of a situation where the separate corporate entity
should not be, but is, adhered to is found where a shareholder is
27 Minifie v. Rowley, supra note 13.
18 Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942).
10 It is language such as the following quote that creates "alter ego" problems: "Be-
fore the acts and obligations of a corporation can be legally recognized as those of a par-
ticular person, and vice versa, the following combination of circumstances must be made
to appear: First that the corporation is not only influenced and governed by that person,
but there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the individuality, or separateness
of the said person and corporation has ceased; second, that the facts are such that an
adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would, under the
particular circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote injustice .... It is not necessary
... that the complaint allege actual fraud; it is sufficient if the facts set forth disclose
that the dealings were in form with a corporation but in reality with an individual and
that a refusal to recognize this fact will bring about inequitable results." (Emphasis
added.) Minifie v. Rowley, supra note 13, at 487-88, 202 Pac. at 676. See also Wenban
Estate Inc. v. Hewlett, supra note 13; Judelson v. American Metal Bearing Co., 89 Cal.
App. 2d 256, 200 P.2d 836 (1948).
20 1 O'Ns-L 22; A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation,
33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700, 741 (1958).
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allowed to become a secured creditor of the corporation. The case of
Middleton v. Arastraville Mining Co.21 illustrates the inequities of
such a situation. Plaintiff, general manager of the corporation and
holder of 40 per cent of its stock, sued to foreclose a mortgage on
corporate property. Parties seeking to assert wage liens intervened
as defendants. It was held that since plaintiff's mortgage was recorded
first he had a priority even though the labor giving rise to defendants'
wage liens was performed at plaintiff's request.
This is a prime example of the inequity and capacity for fraud
which is created by allowing a shareholder of a close corporation to
become a secured creditor of the corporation. It is suggested that an
approach similar to that taken by the Uniform Partnership Act 22 would
be proper in respect to close corporations. A stockholder should not
be allowed to be a secured creditor except as to other stockholders,
and any debts owed by the corporation to a stockholder should be
postponed until the debts owed to non-stockholding creditors have
been satisfied.
Legislation dealing with the problem of a shareholder asserting
himself to be a preferred creditor seems easy to devise. The problems
arising from other types of fraudulent use of the corporate shield are
more difficult to cure. The decisions by the nature of the problem turn
on delicate questions of fact. No legislation can provide an answer to
just when the corporation becomes a shield for fraud. It is proposed,
however, that a general recognition of the independent character of
a close corporation and the organization's inherent and desirable flex-
ibility will indicate the legislature's desire that the courts refrain from




The preceding discussion was concerned with the relationship of
the close corporation with non-stockholders. The remainder of this
article will be concerned with the relationship of the shareholders
with each other and with the corporation. It is in connection with
this aspect of the close corporation that the greatest reform is needed.
The formalities imposed on public issue corporations are justified by
the wide distribution and the correspondingly strong public interest.
There is, however, little or no public interest involved in regulating
21 146 Cal. 219, 79 Pac. 889 (1905). Cf. Park Terrace Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co.,
241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955); on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956).
22 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15001-45.
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the internal structure of close corporations. "When there is substantial
identity between the shareholders and the directors ... the elaborate
statutory machinery of corporate government tends to be an obstacle
to the making of internal arrangements which the partners want and
which do not harm anyone else."23
Stockholders in a close corporation often seek to circumvent the
formalities imposed on public issue corporations and achieve a part-
nership type relationship by use of appropriate provisions in the ar-
ticles24 and by-laws25 of the corporation and by contracts among
themselves known as shareholders' agreements. The validity of the
provision often depends on where it is found26 (articles, by-laws, or
shareholders' agreement) and its purpose.27  Generally, articles and
by-laws are subject to more rigid control 28 than are shareholders'
agreements. 29 This is indicated by the dictum in Oakland Scavenger
Co. v. Gandi,30 where the validity of a by-law restriction on transfer-
ability of stock was in issue. There the court said: "A by-law adopted
by a majority vote binds stockholders who do not assent. Even a by-
23 A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 700, 744 (1958). It is further stated in that article at 745 that "as a matter of policy,
there is no justification for a formalistic-perhaps one might even say sadistic-insistence
upon unnecessary and inevitable internal structure or operational organization as a con-
dition of limited liability in the close corporation."
24 "The articles may include any desired provisions: ... (c) Imposing any limitations
and requirements authorized by this division, and otherwise regulating the business and
affairs of the corporation and the powers of the directors and shareholders in a manner
not in conflict with the law." CAL. Corp. CODE § 305.
2 5 CAL. Cor'. CoDE § 501 which specifies several subjects of permissable by-law
provisions, states: "The by-laws of a corporation may make provisions not in conflict with
law of its articles for: . . .(k) any other proper and lawful regulations."
26 Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAw & CON-
TEMP. POB. 435, 447 (1953).
27 1 ONEAL 243; e.g., Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 103 Cal. 357, 35 Pac. 1045,
37 Pac. 207 (1894). (Purpose of contract was to maintain A as officer. Invalidated accom-
panying agreement to elect him a director.)
28 The case for rigid control is set forth in BAmLLANTNE & STmMaNc, CALFORNIA
CoRmoaTioN LA Ws 53 (1949): "Articles of incorporation are not merely a contract
between the incorporators or organizers as to their own enterprise. They are much more,
viz., the constitution of a continuing business association to consist of a shifting of group
associates who are expected to invest their money in the enterprise, or take by transfer the
places of those who have invested. Future shareholders who contribute the capital have no
voice in drafting the articles and most of them invest without reading the articles to
ascertain provisions which may deprive shareholders of their customary rights and pro-
tection. Special and unusual provisions may thus prove traps for unwary investors and
give opportunity for abuse and oppression by the management."
20 "Articles, but not shareholders' agreements or by-laws, are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Secretary of State; articles, by-laws, and those shareholders' agreements which
pertain to the issue of securities or to which the corporation is a party are subject to
examination by the Commissioner of Corporations." ScHwjzam, CEB 410.
2051 Cal. App. 2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942).
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law, if invalid, may operate as a binding agreement on those who
assent to it, if not opposed to public policy as a contract."31 (Emphasis
added.)
However, it must be noted that there may be limitations on the
extent to which a corporation will be bound by contracts to which it
is not explicitly made a party, or where it has not expressly adopted
the contract. 32 This should be kept in mind when examining the extent
to which various intra-corporate policies desired by the shareholders
may be implemented by provisions in the articles, by-laws, share-
holders' agreements or by any combination thereof. A careful choice
of the method to be used to accomplish the desired result is necessary.
As previously stated, shareholders in a close corporation are de-
sirous of escaping the corporate norms applicable to public issue cor-
porations. They seek, and it is felt should be allowed, to formulate
their own intra-corporate policies.
The subject of these intra-corporate policies are listed by O'Neal
as follows: 33
(1) how the shares of the parties to the agreement are to be voted
in elections of directors;
(2) who are to be the officers of the corporation;
(3) long-term employment arrangements for some or all of the par-
ticipants;
(4) the salaries to be paid shareholder-officers;
(5) the power one or more of the participants is to have to veto
corporate decisions;
(6) the circumstances in which dividends are to be declared; and
(7) a method of resolving corporate disputes, e.g., an arbitration
provision or some method for dissolving the corporation in the
event of dissension or deadlock among the shareholders or di-
rectors.
It should be noted that the above list pertains only to the manage-
ment or actual everyday operations of the corporation. There are also
some non-management problems that require special treatment in a
close corporation. Representative of these are buy out arrangements,
non-competition clauses and stock transfer restrictions.
34
B. Stock Transfer Restrictions
Shareholders in a close corporation often consider themselves part-
ners. There are few stockholders and generally they take an active part
31 Id. at 81, 124 P.2d at 150. See also Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706
(1932); Fawkes v. Farm Lands Inv. Co., 112 Cal. App. 374, 297 Pac. 47 (1931).
32 Peek v. Steinberg, 163 Cal. 127, 124 Pac. 834 (1912).
33 1 O'NEAL 224.
3 The related problems of buy out arrangements and non-competition clauses are
not discussed in this article.
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in the management and operation of the business. Also the corpora-
tion is often the "family business." For these reasons the stockholders
are very interested in who their fellow stockholders may be. To protect
themselves from the contingency that shares will come into the pos-
session of objectionable persons, the shareholders place restrictions
on the transferability of shares. It has been stated: 85
Restrictions upon the transferability of shares most commonly fall
under one of the following types:
(1) a preemptive or optional right in favor of the corporation to
purchase in preference to outsiders;
(2) the reservation of a similar right in favor of other shareholders;
(3) the requirement of approval or consent of the directors or share-
holders to a transfer;
(4) a limitation on the classes of persons to whom a transfer may be
made;
(5) a reservation of a lien upon shares to secure debts due to the
corporation.
All of these restrictions to varying degrees violate the policy of
maintaining freedom of alienability. Their validity, therefore, is said
to rest on their reasonableness.30 The test has been said to be "whether
the restraint is sufficiently needed by the particular enterprise to justify
overriding the general policy against restraints on alienation."37 Gen-
erally, absolute prohibitions on transfer are invalid.3 8 However, the
recent amendment to the California Civil Code, 9 abolishing the stat-
utory rule against the suspension of alienation arguably could indicate
a tendency toward more liberal treatment of absolute prohibitions.
A restriction giving existing shareholders a right to veto the seller's
choice of a purchaser is known as a consent provision. No cases were
found in California dealing directly with consent provisions although
the provision in Oakland Scavenger Co. v. Gandi4" was very similar
35 BALLr.~m & STmR.m, CALIORIA. CORPORATION LAws 71 (1949). See also
2 O'N' 6.
36 CAL. CoRn'. CODE § 501 states: "The by-laws of a corporation may make provisions
not in conflict with law or its articles for: ... (g) Special qualifications of persons who
may be shareholders, and reasonable restrictions upon the right to transfer or hypothecate
shares." Note that under a strict construction of this statute qualifications for shareholders
may be unreasonable. It is doubtful, however, that any unreasonable restriction or quali-
fication would be upheld.
37 2 ONEAL 10.
38 But see Smith v. S.F. & N.P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897), where a
voting trust which included an absolute reservation of voting rights on any shares trans-
ferred was upheld.
39 Former CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.1. Repealed Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 470, § 1, p. 2405.
40 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942).
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to a consent provision.41 There a restriction making the corporation a
trustee of the deceased stockholder for purposes of selling his stock
was upheld. The status of consent provisions in other jurisdictions is
unsettled.42 California Corporations Code section 501 (g) allows a
by-law provision setting forth ". . . special qualifications of persons
who may be shareholders ... ." A broad construction of this section
would seem to provide a basis for the validity of consent provisions.
The use of first option provisions, which are also known as a right
of first refusal, seems to be the generally recommended form of stock
transfer restriction.43 These provisions give the continuing stock-
holders a right to purchase, at their option, before the seller may offer
stock to outsiders. Such provisions however, are not without prob-
lems in California.
These restrictions may properly be placed in the articles, 44 by-
laws,45 or in a shareholders' agreement. 46 The choice of which of these
instruments is to be used is an important one and should be carefully
made.
Such significant issues as the amendability of the restriction may
depend on where it is found. A restriction placed in the articles may
require a two-thirds vote for amendment, 47 whereas a by-law41 pro-
vision or a shareholders' agreement 49 can probably provide for any
reasonable amendatory procedure involving at least a majority vote.
There also may be some problem as to the binding effect of a share-
41 This agreement was really more in the nature of a limitation on the type of person
who could be a successor than a consent provision.
42 Tracey v. Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A.2d 780 (1948), aff'd 31 Del. Ch. 477,
67 A.2d 56 (1949) (holding consent restriction invalid); 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier,
289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935) (consent restriction valid); Penthouse Properties,
Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939) (consent of
corporation required, valid).
43 2 O'NEAL 13; SCFWARZER, CEB 431; Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorpo-
rated Partnership, 18 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB. 435, 446 (1953).
44 Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234 (1951).
45 CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (g).
46 Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); cf., Smith v. S.F. & N.P.
Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897). In Bodkin v. Silveira, 49 Cal. App. 2d 1, 120
P.2d 910 (1942), a voting trust agreement was validly used to impose a stock transfer
restriction.
-, In Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp., supra note 44, an article giving shareholders
a first option could not be amended with the two-thirds vote provided for in CAL. CORP.
CODE § 3634 (h). Section 3634 (h) requires a two-thirds vote "to diminish or alter ad-
versely any options or rights theretofore granted to the holders thereof to purchase other
shares of the corporation."
48 However, the by-laws themselves could provide for a greater than majority vote
for amendment. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500.
49 It has been suggested that a shareholders' agreement would require unanimous
consent for amendment unless otherwise specified in the agreement. ScHvA nza, CEB 411.
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holders' agreement on the non-assenting shareholders, 50 whereas an
article or by-law passed by a majority would bind all shareholders
whether or not they assented. Wherever the restrictive provision is
placed, the fact of the restriction must be noted on the face of the
stock certificate.5'
Restrictive provisions are subject to review by either the Secretary
of State5" or the Commissioner of Corporations 53 or both, and may
be disapproved if the consideration is found to be inadequate 4 or if in
any other way the agreement is found to be improper. There is a possi-
bility, however, that even though either of those officials disapproves
of a provision it still may be enforced by the courts as a valid share-
holders agreement.55 Note, however, that the Commissioner will prob-
ably examine even non-by-law shareholder agreements connected with
the issuance of stock and a disapproval by him would render stock
issued in violation of his order void.50 It would seem that public
policy would demand that contracts concerning the transfer of such
stock, or the interest represented thereby, would also be void.
A recent opinion of the Attorney General casts some doubt on the
extent to which the Commissioner may require his approval of stock
transfer restrictions. 57 It was held that the Corporate Securities Act 58
did not require submission of a shareholders' agreement restricting
the transfer of the previously issued stock of a three man corporation,
and that the agreement, so far as it gave an option to the shareholders,
was not within the terms of the Act.59 The sale to the corporation
would not require a permit either. Therefore it was not necessary to
require a permit before entering into the shareholders' agreement. It
should be noted, however, that the shares were already issued and
50 Oakland Scavenger v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942).
51 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2404; Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932);
Mancini v. Patrizi, 110 Cal. App. 42,293 Pac. 828 (1930). This requirement is also found
in the UNiFoRm SToCK TRANsFER ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. § 15. There is a problem whether
the agreement itself or merely notice thereof must appear on the certificate.
52 See note 29 supra.
531d.
5
4 Vannucci v. Pedrini, supra note 51, allowed an agreement where purchase price
was set at book value. It has been suggested that the Secretary of State and Commissioner
of Corporations would be more likely to approve a valuation set by formula.
55 Cf. Vannucci v. Pedrini, supra note 51; Oakland Scavenger Co. v. Gandi, supra
note 50; Fawkes v. Farmland Inv. Co., 112 Cal. App. 374, 279 Pac. 47 (1931). The ques-
tion always exists, however, as to how far public policy can be stretched. Smith v. Cali-
fornia Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 18 P.2d 393 (1933).
56 CAL. CORP. CODE § 26100. Cf. Reed v. Norman, 41 Cal. 2d 17, 256 P.2d 930
(1953).
57 34 Ops. CAL. ArY. Gmr. 191 (1959).
58 CAL. Cop. CODE §§ 25000-26104.
5934 Ops. CAL. A=-r. GmN. 191, 192 (1959); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25152.
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the opinion is based on the finding that a sale to either the share-
holders or the corporation was not within the Act. An agreement con-
nected with the initial issuance of the securities may present a different
problem. The Commissioner could probably refuse to permit such
issuance on condition of examining and approving any shareholders'
agreements affecting the transferability of the stock. It would seem
that the exemption from the Commissioner's perusal afforded by this
option will be limited to agreements entered into subsequent to the
initial issuance of stock.
There are two basic types of options, those running to the stock-
holders and those that give the corporation a right to purchase the
stock directly.
Even though an option going to the shareholders will probably
be valid 60 it may not be advisable. An important aspect of the man-
agement of a close corporation is the balance of control between its
shareholders. An offer to the remaining shareholders may find one
shareholder unable to meet the purchase price. This could bring about
a drastic change in the balance of power. Also, it is often the case that
the stockholders have most of their funds invested in the corporation.
Withdrawal of such funds to buy this stock may be possible only by
means of costly dividends61 and may drain the corporation of needed
working capital.
Another problem connected with a purchase by the shareholders
is based on the fact that several shareholders will also be directors
and officers of the corporation. A sale to them may give rise to prob-
lems concerning their fiduciary duty to the seller.
62
If the option is made to run to the corporation many of these
problems are avoided. The problem of draining corporate working
capital would still exist. However, payment will probably be more
easily achieved because there is little problem that a tax on dividends
will be imposed.6 3 Further, though either method will cause a differ-
ence in each stockholder's proportion of the whole, there is no chance
60 Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932).
61 This will not be a problem if the corporation elects Subchapter S treatment. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
62 See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). Note also SEC Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-6 (1960 Supp.).
63 When the corporation pays for the stock out of its earnings and profits, the Internal
Revenue Service may assert this is a dividend to the continuing shareholders. This argu-
ment succeeded in Louis Zipp, 28 T.C. 314 (1957), aff'd Zipp v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d
119 (6th Cir. 1958). However, the case of Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3rd
Cir. 1958), found this not to be a dividend. The Commissioner has acquiesced, Rev. Rul.
58-614, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 920. See RicE, FAMILY TAX PLANNING 521-522 (State Bar
of Cal., Comm. on Continuing Education of the Bar, 1959).
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of a drastic shift in the balance of power due to the lack of liquidity
of one stockholder. Further, ownership of the stock by the corporation
may facilitate the admission of a new shareholder64 since a sale by the
shareholders would be subject to taxation on any gain therefrom,
whereas a sale by the corporation of its treasury stock would be tax
free.
65
However, the validity of first options to the corporation has not
always been certain in California.66 The present limitations on the
corporation's ability to purchase its own stock are found in sections
1705 to 1708 of the Corporations Code. Most important of these sec-
tions for present purposes is section 1707 which states:
A corporation may also purchase shares issued by it, or by a corpora-
ti6n of which it is a subsidiary, in any of the following cases:
(b) From surplus resulting from a reduction of stated capital, sub-
ject to provisions of section 5 of this part.
(c) Subject to any limitations contained in its articles, out of earned
surplus ....
It would seem then that any restriction giving an option to the
corporation should state that the corporation can purchase only out of
earned surplus or reduction surplus in order for the option to be valid.
Perhaps an agreement could validly bind the shareholders to reduce
stated capital to create sufficient surplus to purchase the stock. It
should be noted that paid in surplus is not available for the purchase
of the corporations' own securities. No justification for this is apparent,
especially in light of the 1957 amendment releasing paid in surplus for
payment of dividends.
67
The validity of stock transfer restrictions is generally recognized
in California today. However, in order to clarify and, in some ways,
alter the present law on this subject, it is recommended that something
in the nature of the following statute be adopted:
The articles or by-laws of a close corporation may set reasonable
qualifications for shareholders, provide for transfer by a shareholder
of stock only with consent of the other shareholders, or create other
reasonable restrictions upon the right to transfer or hypothecate
shares.
It is also suggested that an amendment to California Corporations
"However, it should be noted that a subsequent sale by the corporation would prob-
ably require a permit, but a subsequent sale by the shareholders might be exempt under
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25152.
65 INT. 1Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1032.
66 Mancini v. Patrizi, 87 Cal. App. 435, 262 Pac. 375 (1927).
67 CAL. Corn,. CODE § 1500 (c) as amended in Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 2261, § 9, p. 3951.
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Code section 1707 be made authorizing the purchase by a corporation
of its stock out of paid in surplus.
C. Management of Corporate Affairs-Control Devices
1. Introduction
Stockholders in a close corporation often want to be treated as
partners among themselves. The minority shareholders want to have
an active voice in the business, and perhaps an ability to veto outra-
geous action by the majority. The majority wants protection from
being "blackmailed" by a "vetoing" minority shareholder. High in-
come shareholders want to leave the profits in the business for purposes
of expansion;68 lower income shareholders want some sort of guar-
anteed income. Generally, all shareholders want to be free to operate
quickly and flexibly without the concern that disregard to corporate
formalities will destroy their limited liability.
Obviously, not all of these interests can be satisfied. However, it
is urged that the shareholders of a close corporation should be left
free to determine solutions to these problems.
Presently, however, any attempts by the stockholders in a close
corporation to escape the needlessly binding formalities of corporate
norms must overcome the restrictions imposed by, and the control of
the Commissioner of Corporations. It seems difficult to justify the
Commissioner's powers in controlling the methods of arranging the
internal affairs of a close corporation since no public interest is there
involved.
The traditional corporate framework includes a board of directors
who are the actual operational managers. This public issue corpora-
tion oriented delegation of powers is of questionable value in a close
corporation6 9 since the shareholders, directors and officers of a close
corporation often are identical. One state, Iowa, has recognized this
and has dispensed with the requirement of a board of directors.-6 It
would seem that in such a jurisdiction the opposition to management
by agreement, or informal management procedures, would be greatly
reduced.
68 The purpose of this expansion is a possible sale of the corporation and the realiza-
tion of capital gain. E.g., In re Security Finance Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957).
69 The theory is also questionable. "The theory that the corporation conducts its
normal operations only through directors is based upon the unfounded assumption that
there is a traditional division of corporate functions. However, some of today's so-called
'norms' are the precise reverse of earlier practices. Shareholders in the eighteenth century
voted directly on certain matters of corporate policy and appointed executive officers."
William H. Neiman, in Panel Discussion, Proceedings at the Annual Meeting of the Sec-
tion of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Chicago, Ill., Aug. 16-17, 1954, in 10
Busi,.ss LAWYER 9, 36 (1954).
7o IA. CODE ANN. §§ 491.1-491.71.
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California, however, retains the formal requirement of a board of
directors in which all corporate power is vested. Any attempts to fix
management policies by prior agreement or to circumvent the con-
fining formalities of corporate procedure must contend with section 800
of the Corporations Code which states:
71
Subject to limitations of the articles and of this division as to
action which shall be authorized or approved by the shareholders, all
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority of, and the
business and affairs of every corporation shall be controlled by a board
of not less than three directors.
Although some shareholder control evidently is allowable, this
section, and the philosophy represented thereby, has been used to
strike down many types of intra-corporate agreements and policy de-
cisions on the ground that they "withdraw from the directors of the
corporation that control and direction of its corporate affairs, business
and management which is vested in them by law ...."72 This does
not mean, however, that all agreements concerning management of
the corporation will be void.78 The courts have said that those agree-
ments causing only a "slight infringement"74 on the authority of the
directors will be valid. Obviously this provides no guide to future
action and an examination of specific problems and possible solutions
is necessary.
2. Control Through Stock Ownership
The stockholders in a close corporation being forced to recognize
the board of directors as the ultimate authority, will want representa-
tion on this board. A minority shareholder especially is interested in
having an active voice in the management.
The degree of representation on the board of directors depends on
the number of shares held by each shareholder. There would be no
problem of attaining equal representation if each shareholder contrib-
uted an amount of capital in proportion to the others entitling him to
the agreed degree of control. Unfortunately, many prospective share-
holders often are not going to invest anything but a nominal amount
of capital and the unmeasurable value of their future services.
It would be a perfectly valid arrangement in a partnership for
71 The requirement of three directors often causes the appointment of "dummy di-
rectors." This can be a dangerous practice if the "dummy" is "bought" by one of the
actual owners. See Cardoza v. Millington, 142 Cal. App. 2d 26, 297 P.2d 778 (1956); cf.
Mannon v. Pesula, 59 Cal. App. 2d 597, 139 P.2d 336 (1943).
72 Smith v. California Thom Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 98, 18 P.2d 393, 395
(1933).
73 HilIman v. Hillman Land Co., 81 Cal. App. 2d 174, 183 P.2d 730 (1947).
74 Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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such an investor to be given an equal voice in the management. How-
ever, in a close corporation it is questionable if the issuance of shares
for future services will be proper.
California Corporation Code section 1109 states:
No shares of stock ... shall be issued except in consideration...
(c) Services actually rendered.
If authorized in its articles or by-laws, a corporation may issue
the whole or any part of its shares or its certificates for shares prior to
full payment under such restrictions as are imposed by this division.
This section would seem to be a complete bar to the issuance of
stock for future services. It has been widely held in other jurisdictions
that the words "work done" or "services rendered" do not include
future services. 75 Indeed this is the fair import of these words and the
California statute seems to clearly impose this meaning.
It should be noted in this connection that the corporation may issue
shares though not fully paid up.76 Such shares are subject to certain
restrictions such as dividends proportionate only to the value paid of
the total amount due,77 and the possible subjection to assessment by
creditors. 71 They may, however, be validly issued even though there
is to be a future payment of cash or property. Arguably, future pay-
ment of services should be treated no differently than future payment
of cash or property. All are treated by section 1109 in the past tense:
"money paid," "property . . . received," and "services . . . rendered."
However there is a problem in enforcing a contract for future services
that does not appear in contracts for payment of money or property.
In spite of such problems, however, it is felt the parties should be
allowed to distribute control on the basis of services to be rendered.
An auxiliary problem that must be faced is that arising where stock
is issued for future services where the recipient shareholder not only
gets a voice in management, but also gets an interest in the corpora-
tion's assets which is disproportionate to his investment. This may be
objectionable to an investor who, though willing to relinquish some of
his control, is not willing to relinquish his interest in his investment.
75 Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Mont. 469, 197 Pac. 1005 (1921); Her-
bert v. Duryea, 34 App. Div. 478, 54 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1898), aff'd 164 N.Y. 596, 58 N.E.
1088 (1900). See 1 O'NEAL 71.
76 Also the corporation can set a valuation on shares issued other than for cash. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1112. The corporation will be estopped to contest the validity of shares it
has issued as paid up. California Trona Co. v. Wilkinson, 20 Cal. App. 694, 130 Pac. 190
(1912).
77 CAL. CORP. CODE § 1508.
78 Bing Crosby Minute Maid Corp. v. Eaton, 46 Cal. 2d 484, 297 P.2d 5 (1956).
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Devices such as classification of stock 79 or use of preferred as well as
common stock overcome this problem. However, they also destroy
any chance to use Subchapter S.80
A minority shareholder can be assured some degree of representa-
tion through cumulative voting, which is mandatory in California.8'
A directorship secured through cumulative voting is protected from
arbitrary removal by the majority by a provision that the removal of
a director may be vetoed by the cumulated votes needed to elect him.3
2
However, this may not be satisfactory to a minority shareholder who
wants an equal voice and because of his talents is entitled to it.
As said above, a partnership could easily solve this problem by an
agreement that each partner should have an equal voice in the man-
agement regardless of his capital contribution. Although in Cardoza
v. Millington,"3 a California court created equal voting rights where
the shareholders' capital was unequal in order to prevent injustice, it
is doubtful that an agreement to distribute voting power in a manner
divergent from shareholdings would be allowed either by the Com-
missioner of Corporations or the courts. Further, it would seem that
Corporations Code section 2216 would prohibit use of such a device.
It states that "if there is only one class of shares outstanding which is
not divided into series, or if there is only one series of shares outstand-
ing, any limitations or restrictions imposed on the voting rights of
shareholders shall be ineffective." It is submitted that to give any
shares a disproportionate voting power would have the effect of plac-
ing a restriction on the other shares and as such would be a violation
of this section. It is thus apparent that a forthright arrangement
whereby a stockholder is given more votes than his shares of stock
would otherwise warrant will be stricken down.8 4 Such arrangements
may be possible to a limited extent, however, by more devious means.
79 "Corporations Code Section 1100 now permits the articles to authorize almost all
possible combinations of classes, series and kinds of shares, including classes of different
par values, par value and non-par, and with full, limited or no voting rights." BALI.ANT=IE
& STERLING, CALIFoNIA CooATION LAws 127 (1949).
80 A tax option can have only one class of stock. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371
(a) (4).
81 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 2235.
82 CAL. CoRn'. CODE § 810. Note that a simple majority can remove the whole board.
Of course cumulative voting will protect the minority shareholder in a subsequent election.
83 142 Cal. App. 2d 26, 297 P.2d 778 (1956). Here a corporation was formed to
continue an active partnership. The incorporation agreement gave each partner a right to
stock equivalent to their capital in the partnership. One partner failed to withdraw any
capital and thus attempted to claim a larger portion of stock than the other. Cf. Kaufman
v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730, 140 P.2d 210 (1943).
84 See Nickolopoulos v. Sarantis, 102 N.J. Eq. 585, 141 At. 792 (Ct. of Err. & App.
1928) (agreement to give holder of 25% of the stock 50% of the voting power was
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3. Pooling Agreements, Voting Trusts, and Proxies
Other methods by which voting may be controlled or a veto may
be created are pooling agreements, proxies, voting trusts, high quorum
requirements and requirements for higher than a majority vote. These
provisions are not limited merely to the selection of directors but can
be used in connection with other aspects of shareholder action.
Pooling agreements are used to assure that the stock of a group
of shareholders will be voted in the manner directed by a specified
percentage of that group. It is useful to several smaller shareholders
who seek to protect themselves from the dictatorship of a large share-
holder, or to unite so as to give themselves control. There is no doubt
as to the validity of a pooling agreement in California;8" the only prob-
lem is the enforcement of the agreement.
The usual method of enforcing a pooling arrangement is by means
of a proxy system. These proxies may be given to the other members
of the agreement or to an independent arbitrator 86 to vote in accord-
ance with the decision of the members to the agreement.
Proxies are limited to a period not exceeding seven years.8 7 A
pooling agreement created for twelve years giving a proxy to X for
the first five years to vote the stock in conformity with the will of the
majority of the members of the agreement was void as exceeding the
seven year time limit.88 Note that the whole agreement was void, not
just that part in excess of seven years. No justification is evident for
not allowing the validity of the proxy for the period within the statu-
tory limits and only voiding the excess.
However, even if a proxy is stated to be created for a term within
the seven year limit, it will be revocable unless "coupled with an in-
terest."89 It is not quite clear what is meant by this phrase.
In Smith v. S. F. & N. P. Ry. Co.,90 a five year pooling agreement
proxy was created in connection with the purchase of a large block
void); Contra, E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288
(1954). Theoretically, this could be done in California by use of a voting trust, but it is
doubtful that the Commissioner of Corporations would allow such a voting trust to be
created.
85 Smith v. S.F. & N.P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
86 There is a chance that these proxies would not be enforced. See Ringling Bros.
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603
(1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
87 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2226, 2228.
88 Simpson v. Nielson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 246 Pac. 342 (1926).
89 See note 87 supra. This is based partly on the traditional view that voting rights
could not be separated from ownership, and partly on the idea that a proxy is an agency
relationship.
90 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
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of stock by the three parties to the agreement. When one of the parties
attempted to question an election where his stock had been voted in
accord with this agreement the court stated that the agreement was
valid and binding on the plaintiff. The proxy was irrevocable because
it was created for the mutual promises of each party to purchase the
stock involved and was therefore "in the nature of a power coupled
with an interest."91
This case was one of the originators of the doctrine of irrevocability
of proxies when coupled with an interest. Other jurisdictions have
cited it often and expanded "interest" to include the power to sell the
shares,92 and a right of first refusal.93 California, however, does not
seem to have progressed as far. In Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp.
9 4
a proxy given with a conditional contract of sale was considered not
coupled with an interest and was revocable.
The concept of power coupled with an interest was adopted to
allow irrevocability of a relationship thought to be in the nature of
an agency. It is now apparent that in this situation the proxy holder
is not a true agent. The fact that it is necessary to exercise the proxy
indicates that the proxy holder is acting adverse to his supposed prin-
cipal's wishes. The proxy really is nothing more than a tool for specific
performance of this contract between the shareholders and should be
treated as irrevocable regardless of any "interest" in the proxy holder.
A sensible approach to the problem would do away with the use of
the proxy altogether and would allow specific performance directly.
Another type of voting arrangement, in many ways similar to a
pooling agreement, is the voting trust.93 It, like the pooling agree-
ment, was originally condemned as an illegal separation of voting
power from ownership, but it is generally accepted as valid today.
However, this early apprehension still finds some recognition. This
is illustrated by the leading Delaware case of Ambercrombie v. Da-
vies,90 where an agreement not conforming with the statute governing
voting trusts was void.
It is doubtful that this result would be reached in California. Cali-
fornia Corporations Code section 2230 authorizes the creation of voting
trusts by stating, "Shares of stock in any corporation may be trans-
ferred to trustees in order to confer upon them the right to vote and
91 Id. at 600, 47 Pac. at 587.
92 Groub v. Blish, 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N.E. 609 (1926).
9 3 State ex rel. Everett Trust & Savings Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash.
2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945).
04106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234 (1951).
95 See Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 TEXAS L. REV.
139 (1942).
96 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957).
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otherwise represent the shares." In Boericke v. Weise, 97 it was held
that the voting trust was valid even though no stock had been trans-
ferred to a trustee, and in Doherty v. Cross,98 an agreement held in-
valid as a voting trust was held to be a valid proxy. These two cases,
and the permissive rather than obligatory language of the Code seem
to dispose of the Ambercrombie problem in California.
Voting trusts are nothing more than pooling agreements and
would be made almost useless by adoption of a provision allowing
specific performance of a pooling agreement without resorting to
proxies "coupled with an interest." The voting trust is presently advan-
tageous, however, in that it provides a system of enforcing a pooling
type agreement, and can be made irrevocable for a period of twenty-
one years 99 rather than the seven year limit on proxies.
It should be noted that presently voting trust agreements are re-
quired to be submitted to the Commissioner of Corporations. 100 Prob-
ably a pooling agreement connected with the issuance of stock will
also be subject to his official scrutiny.' 0 ' It is difficult to see any interest
that the public would have in the regulation of these private voting
agreements between the shareholders of a close corporation that justi-
fies this regulation.
Pooling agreements and voting trusts are effective to unify the
strength of several minority shareholders. It is doubtful that they could
be used to change the ratio between an individual's stockholdings and
his voting power. As was stated above, such a disproportionate voting
power arrangement could be a very useful tool to a close corporation.
It would seem advisable to allow the shareholders to perfect such ar-
rangement without resort to devious means. This is not possible under
the present law.
To remedy this situation a statute should be passed clearly speci-
fying that the shareholders may distribute voting power in any manner
they see fit even though unrelated to the stockholding ratio of the
shareholders. The following is the type of statute recommended:
Each share of stock of a close corporation shall be entitled to one vote
unless otherwise stated in the articles or by-laws. This section shall
not prevent an agreement among the shareholders that allows a share-
holder a proportion of the voting power that is different than his
proportionate share of the voting stock outstanding.
9 68 Cal. App. 2d 407, 156 P.2d 781 (1945).
98 65 Cal. App. 2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (1944).
99 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2231.
100 Barney v. First Nat. Bank of Monterey, 90 P.2d 584 (D.C.A. Cal. 1939).
101 Scmv mZFn, CEB 408.
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4. Higher Than Majority Vote and Quorum Requirements
Two other methods of giving a minority shareholder some measure
of control over corporate affairs are the use of greater than majority
vote and greater than majority quorum requirements. These devices
will not give a minority shareholder the ability to dictate corporate
policy, but they will provide him with a protective veto against any
policy antagonistic to his interests. Even if the statute suggested above
was adopted, these devices would still be useful in situations where it
is desired to give a minority shareholder a voice or a veto but not af-
firmative control.
High majority requirements may be imposed on director as well
as shareholder action. California Corporations Code section 817 pro-
vides that the articles or by-laws or both may require any number
greater than a majority of the directors present to authorize corporate
action or make corporate decisions. Whether this section allows a re-
quirement of unanimous assent to be placed on directors' actions is
doubtful. 1
02
California Corporation Code section 816 allows the articles to de-
termine the number of directors necessary to constitute a quorum. In
no case shall this number be less than two, or one-third of the number
of directors, whichever is greater. The quorum requirement finally
chosen should resolve the conflict between the following factors. A
low quorum requirement would allow more freedom and flexibility in
the operations of the corporation. It could, however, put the minority
shareholders at the mercy of the majority. A high quorum requirement
arms the minority with a veto exercisable by the simple act of not at-
tending meetings. Since once a quorum is present, the meeting cannot
be voided by a shareholder leaving,103 a high quorum requirement is
useless to the minority stockholders without strict notice requirements
concerning the business to take place at the forthcoming meeting. This
is a return to formalism. The function served by a high quorum re-
quirement could be better served by greater than majority vote re-
quirements.
No section in the Corporations Code provides for shareholders the
blanket authorization of greater than majority vote requirements which
is authorized for the directors by section 817. Such authorization is
granted for some specific types of shareholder action, however.104
102 Id. at 425. See also, Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829
(1945).
103 CA I. CORP. CODE § 2212. No similar provision is set forth as to quorum for direc-
tors' meetings. It would seem to be an analagous situation, however.
104 E.g., CA.L. CORP. CoDE. § 3632 (an amendment of articles); CAL. Corn. CODE
§ 3901 (sale of substantially all assets).
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Even absent express authorization it is not seen why a shareholders'
agreement could not specify the percentage of votes necessary to au-
thorize action. It is doubtful, however, that a provision requiring
unanimous approval would be upheld. 10 5
Greater than majority vote requirements and other provisions pro-
tecting minority interests found in the articles and by-laws are of no
value if such provisions can be changed by a majority of the share-
holders. Therefore, two of the most important sections authorizing a
greater than majority vote requirement for shareholder action are sec-
tions 500 and 3632 of the Corporations Code. They allow a greater
than majority vote requirement restricting the right of shareholders
to amend the by-laws and the articles respectively.
Section 3632 allows the articles to require for their amendment
consent of the holders of any greater percentage or fraction of the
outstanding shares ... ." Section 500 says only that "the articles or
by-laws may require the vote or written assent of the shareholders en-
titled to exercise more than a majority of the voting power . . ." in
order to amend the by-laws. The words "percentage or fraction" found
in 3632 but not 500, imply less than all. Does the difference between
these sections attempt to create a distinction between the by-laws and
articles by allowing a unanimous vote requirement for the amendment
of by-laws but not for amendment of the articles? No valid reason for
making such a distinction is apparent.
The following statute is recommended to assure that any greater
than majority arrangement, including unanimity requirements, desired
by the shareholders will be valid:
The articles or by-laws of a close corporation may require, in any
instance where consent of the shareholders is necessary or where a
vote of the shareholders is to be had, any vote greater than a majority
including a unanimous vote if that is desired. Nothing in this section
shall be interpreted to limit the right of the shareholders to insert
similar greater than majority requirements in agreements among
themselves.
5. Control by Agreement
The previous discussion was concerned primarily with control at
the shareholder level. Under the present corporate structure there is
also a problem of control at the level of the board of directors. To a
great extent a majority shareholder can guarantee himself control at
both levels. What we are now concerned with, however, is how a
105 Cf. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, supra note 102. It should be noted that the result
of this case has been changed by statute in New York, N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 55. The
philosophy of the decision may still have weight elsewhere, however.
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minority shareholder can be secured in to some measure of control at
the board or officer level. Further, the situation is not uncommon
where one of the shareholders is the driving force of the business. He
may be willing to give his full efforts to the business only if he has full
control of the management thereof. The other stockholders may agree
to this but do not want to give up voting rights in their stock. A similar
situation arises where a person will invest only on a guarantee that a
particular person will remain in active management of the corporation.
The following is a brief discussion of the problems faced in seeking to
achieve such ends.
It is generally accepted that the shareholders can, by means of a
contract among themselves, agree that a specified person be main-
tained as a director. 06 This contract may become invalid, however, if
it includes a provision that such person shall also be an officer.10 7 The
often stated distinction is that shareholders may agree upon a course
of action among themselves but they cannot restrict the board's dis-
cretion.10 This rationale is used in the cases involving the power of
the corporation to enter into, or the power of the shareholders to bind
the corporation to long-term employment contracts. The cases reach
divergent results and it is sometimes difficult to determine when a
valid employment contract becomes an invalid usurpation of the di-
rectors' powers.
Representative of the cases in this area are the cases of Kennerson
v. Burbank Amusement Co.109 and Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni
Mfg. Co. °0
The Kennerson case involved two related corporations. One (A
corporation) owned the land on which a theatre was to be built. The
other (B corporation) was to manage the theatre. Plaintiff seized
control of B corporation and had it adopt a cancellable contract making
him manager of that corporation with "exclusive right to fix and estab-
lish all policies to be followed in the operation of the... [corporation]
.... ,"ll Pending a merger of the two corporations which undoubtedly
would have resulted in termination of his contract, plaintiff caused
106 Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 202 P.2d 748
(1949). See also, Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
1
0
7 Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 103 Cal. 357, 35 Pac. 1045, 37 Pac. 207
(1894).
108 Dyer Bros. Iron Works v. Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 189 Pac. 445 (1920);
Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., supra note 107; Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co.,
120 Cal. App. 2d 157,260 P.2d 823 (1953); Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129
Cal. App. 93, 18 P.2d 393 (1933).
100 Supra note 108.
110 Supra note 106.
Ill Supra note 108, at 162, 260 P.2d at 826.
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B corporation to withdraw the cancellation clause in the contract.
Plaintiff then had a five year non-cancellable contract to manage B.
In this action to recover wages lost by plaintiff because of his dis-
missal, the court found that by this contract with plaintiff ". . . the
board has attempted to confer upon him the practical control and man-
agement of substantially all corporate powers."112 In denying plaintiff
recovery, the court then stated :113
California has recognized the rule that the board cannot delegate its
function to govern. As long as the corporation exists, its affairs must
be managed by the duly elected board. The board may grant author-
ity to act, but it cannot delegate its function to govern. If it does so,
the contract so providing is void.
The court in the Kennerson case indicated that their decision was
based on the "quantum of delegation"' 14 involved. Certainly this
would seem to be an important factor, but the Merlino case casts
some doubt on its validity as a test.
The Merlino case also involved two related corporations. A and B
each owned 50 per cent of X corporation. X owned all the stock of Y
corporation. A and B agreed that so long as A owned 50 per cent of X
corporation A would be in active control of Y corporation at a salary
of 9,000 dollars per year. B later seized control of X corporation and
ousted A from this position. A brought suit to recover damages for
breach of contract. The court upheld the validity of the contract
as a valid agreement between shareholders of a close corporation
without discussing the fact that it infringed on the function of the
board of directors. 1 5
Certainly, this contract giving a shareholder exclusive manage-
ment of a corporation as long as he holds 50 per cent of the stock of a
different corporation is as great an infringement on the board's powers
as was the contract in the Kennerson case. It would seem that the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of these cases, and perhaps the basis for
decision of the more recent cases, is the factor of equality of bargain-
ing power at the time the contract was made, coupled with the pres-
ence or absence of fraud on the part of the person asserting the validity
of the contract.
There does not appear to be as urgent a need to protect the share-
holders in a close corporation from a break in the normal corporate
chain of command as is necessary for stockholders in a public issue
corporation. Since it is usually the case in a close corporation that
112 Id. at 173, 260 P.2d at 832.
113 Id. at 173, 260 P.2d at 832-33.
114 Id. at 174, 260 P.2d at 833.
115 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 202 P.2d 748 (1949).
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directors, officers and shareholders are substantially identical, it is fool-
ish to void a contract made by a shareholder in one capacity because
it infringes on his rights in another capacity. While it is likely that
the courts will not make such an extreme finding in a close corporation
situation in absence of other circumstances such as fraud or over-
reaching, in order to eliminate uncertainty and recognize reality the
following statute is recommended:
A close corporation shall be managed by the board of directors unless
the articles or by-laws specify otherwise. It is not necessary that the
ultimate authority for corporate action be vested in the board of di-
rectors.
A contract such as that found in the Merlino case serves at least
two important purposes. First, it assures a shareholder of an influential
voice in the management of the corporation. Second, it provides a
method for withdrawing funds from the corporation other than by
doubly taxed dividends. The advent of Subchapter S destroys much
of the importance of this second reason, but even so, a "management
contract" is a useful tool for placing the control of the corporation in
the hands of a selected stockholder.
The adoption of a statute similar to the one suggested above would
overcome the objection that "management contracts" infringed on the
powers of the board of directors. However, it still could be urged that
an action on such contract was really a suit for specific performance
of an employment contract. The action in the Merlino case was
treated as on a contract to divide profits rather than on an employment
contract. This seems to be a handy peg on which to hang a decision
enforcing management contracts. Lack of mutuality should not be
assertable to bar a shareholder from maintaining and exercising his
bargained for managerial rights.
A much more difficult problem is presented where the non-man-
aging stockholders seek to bind the managing stockholder to the man-
agement contract. All the policies against specific performance of
employment contracts weigh against enforcing this contract. How-
ever, not enforcing the contract would be a great hardship on the non-
managing stockholders who are relying on the manager's talents for
the success of the corporation. Unfortunately, however, no sound
remedy for these stockholders, other than specific performance, is ap-
parent. Perhaps, however, an injunction of the type found in Lumley
v. Wagner would be an appropriate remedy. The defecting manager
could be enjoined from engaging in any other business within the
sphere of competition of the close corporation. California Civil Code
Feb., 1961] THE CLOSE CORPORATION
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section 3423116 would seem to support the use of such an injunction if
the contract is in writing and the value of the service is over 6,000
dollars per year. There is no requirement in this statute that the con-
tract contain a negative covenant. It is necessary, however, to show
that the services are "of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or
intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value" not adequately
compensable for by damages. The nature of management corporations
might bring them within this category. If not it could be provided for
by statute. This remedy perhaps seems harsh but it must be remem-
bered that such contracts are usually at the insistence of the party
who is to be manager.
D. Dissolution and Deadlock
The many minority protecting devices, and the provisions allowing
flexibility in a close corporation may have the disadvantageous effect
of creating deadlocks and strong differences of opinion. When such
situations arise, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a partnership-like
organization such as a close corporation to function at its peak effi-
ciency. Provisions must be made available to the shareholders allow-
ing them to effectively resolve these differences, or dissolve if the
differences are insoluble.
It has been suggested that arbitration be used as a tool of resolving
intra-corporate disputes.117 Two connected problems immediately
arise, the effectiveness and enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate.
It would never be successful unless the parties are bound to submit
to its use. It is necessary that the parties agree to arbitration before
the dispute arises. Furthermore, some method for enforcing the arbi-
trator's decision must be available.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 provides that an
agreement to settle by arbitration "a controversy thereafter arising
out of the contract or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or... an existing controversy" is valid, enforceable and irrev-
ocable. This changes the common law and allows specific performance
of agreements to arbitrate future disputes. However, it is doubtful
that management controversies in a close corporation are arbitrable
disputes within the terms of this section. 11 They are more in the
nature of policy problems rather than controversies involving inter-
116 See also CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 526.
117 See generally, 2 O'NEAL 180-223; SCHW.BPZER, CEB 438; O'Neal, Resolving Dis-
putes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARv. L. REv. 786
(1954).
118 2 O'NE.L 191; SCMVARZER, CEB 438.
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pretation of contracts or "arising out of the contract." Even so, it is
not readily seen why the parties should not be allowed to submit their
management controversies to arbitration. It would seem a desirable
alternative to dissolution.
A further problem in arbitration agreements is the enforcement of
the arbitrator's award. A simple method of enforcement would be to
give the arbitrator, or the other shareholders, proxies to vote in con-
formity with the arbitrator's award. A famous Delaware case," 9 how-
ever, while upholding the arbitrator's award, failed to cause the proxies
to be voted in conformity with the award. Until provision is made for
the enforcement of the arbitrator's award, the process will remain
practically worthless to close corporations. Perhaps an adoption of
the recommendation made on the section on proxies (i.e., allowing a
proxy to be irrevocable even though not technically coupled with an
interest) would aid also in the effectiveness of arbitration.
If all other attempts to resolve intra-corporate differences and
deadlocks fail, the only recourse is dissolution. California recognizes
two types of corporate dissolution, voluntary 20 and involuntary.
12
Theoretically, voluntary dissolution is the choice of the corporation
rather than the stockholders. 22 It is governed by Corporations Code
section 4600 which states: "Any corporation may elect to wind up its
affairs and voluntarily dissolve by the vote or written consent of share-
holders ... representing 50 per cent or more of the voting power."
Though this section says the vote may be by shareholders representing
"50 per cent or more of the voting power," the Commissioner of Cor-
porations will not file any articles authorizing a vote for voluntary dis-
solution by any other percentage. 23
Until recently, voluntary dissolution under section 4600 was
thought to be completely within the control of the shareholders.
However, in In re Security Finance Co.,' 24 the California Supreme
119 Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
318, 49 A.2d 603, modified 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
120 CAL. Co p. CODE § 4600.
121 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 4650.
122 "Under section 4600 the election to dissolve is the election of the corporation, not
merely shareholders representing 50 per cent of the voting power, although it is through
their consent that the election is made." In re Security Finance Co., 49 Cal. 2d 370, 377,
317 P.2d 1, 5 (1957). It is perhaps for this reason that no "buy out" provisions are
attached by statute to voluntary dissolution but are statutorily created for involuntary
dissolution. See note 129 infra.
1
23 Aspey, Suggestions and Precautions in Drafting Articles of Incorporation, OnGx-
iziNG AN AnvisnoG SmA-LL BusnEmS ENT=lumSES, 162, 172 (State Bar of Cal., Comm.
on Continuing Education of the Bar, 1954). See also Comment, 43 CAr..w. L. REv. 514
(1955).
12449 Cal. 2d 370, 317 P.2d 1 (1957).
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Shareholders representing 50 per cent of the voting power do not have
an absolute right under section 4600 to dissolve a corporation ...
to defraud the other shareholders ... to "freeze out" minority share-
holders.., or to sell assets of the dissolved corporation at an inade-
quate price.
The opinion did not indicate where the burden of proof lay. It
did say, however, that the plaintiff seeking dissolution in the case
showed good faith. If this is interpreted as placing the burden of
proof of good faith on the dissolving shareholder, the doctrine would
appear too restrictive of the right of voluntary dissolution. However,
this would seem to be proper as an affirmative defense. In this con-
nection, it should be noted that the compulsory buy out provisions
of section 4658 are probably not available to shareholders dissenting
from a voluntary dissolution. Section 4658 applies to any "such suit,"
which would seem to refer only to section 4651.
Involuntary dissolution may be brought about by the petition of
holders of one-third of the total shares outstanding who have been
shareholders for not less than six months. 126 It is commonly known
as dissolution for cause. Section 4651 lists the causes justifying the
filing of a complaint for involuntary dissolution and states that "the
court ... may entertain proceedings for the involuntary winding up
or dissolution .. ."127 on a finding that one or more of those causes
exists. (Emphasis added.) This section implies that the court has
discretion to refuse the request for dissolution even though proper
cause is shown.2 s This is difficult to justify when the partnership
characteristics of the close corporation are considered. Furthermore,
when a suit for involuntary dissolution is commenced, the opposing
stockholders, if they have 50 per cent of the stock, may elect to buy
out the petitioning shareholders.' 29 This election does not operate to
estop the opposing shareholders to contest the dissolution,' 30 and the
courts have no discretion to refuse consent to this purchase '31 even
if the shareholders have previously contested the dissolution.
The partnership-like character of close corporations would seem
to indicate the application of partnership-like rules for dissolution.
The Corporations Code, however, is somewhat more restrictive in its
125 Id. at 376-377, 317 P.2d at 5.
126 CAL. CORP. CODE § 4650.
127 CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651.
128 Cf. In re Radom & Neidorff Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E. 2d 563 (1954).
129 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 4658.
130 Esparaza v. Kadam Inc., 170 Cal. App. 2d 303, 338 P.2d 492 (1959).
131 Alvak Enterprises v. Phillips, 167 Cal. App. 2d 69, 334 P.2d 148 (1959); Reese
v. Dardin, 106 Cal. App. 2d 699, 236 P.2d 4 (1951).
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approach to corporate dissolution than to partnership dissolution. In-
dividual treatment of close corporations could remedy this undesirable
difference without impairing the control over public issue corporations.
To this end the following statute is recommended:
A close corporation may be dissolved by the petition of any share-
holder. In any such action, the non-petitioning shareholders, or any
number of them, may avoid the dissolution by purchasing the shares
of stock owned by the petitioning shareholders at their fair cash value.
It may be shown as an affirmative defense to this action that the peti-
tioning shareholder is not acting in good faith.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to bar the formation of an
agreement among the shareholders governing dissolution, even though
in a manner not described by this section.
32
If dissolution is made more readily available to the shareholders,
precautions must be taken to assure adequate notice to creditors so
that dissolution may not be used as a tool to defraud them.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to point up a few of the problems af-
fecting close corporations in California. In a few instances, statutory
reform was suggested. Any statutes set forth were intended only as
guides to the needs of close corporations. They are not intended as
examples of expert draftsmanship and often their phrasing may create
more problems than they solve. However, the drafts proposed are im-
portant in that they represent the type of legislation necessary in
this area.
1
32 It is contemplated that provisions similar to those presently found in CAL. Con'.
CODE § 4658 will exist to govern the valuation of the stock.
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